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DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
L. H. LaRue'

What are we trying to prove when we prove
discriminatory intent? My question is provoked by
some puzzles in the leading cases. So let me begin
by sketching out the background, and then I will
state why the cases puzzle me so.
We start with the majestic generalities of our
Constitution, wherein it is prohibited that any state
should "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."2 The paradigm case
has always been racial discrimination, 3 even though
different judges have differed in judging which racial distinctions add up to the prohibited discriminations. 4 (Even today, for example, I suppose that
public health officials can investigate the links between disease and genes, even though doing so may
entail making racial classifications.)
However, in the paradigm cases, such as Brown
v. Board of Education,' we have no doubt that state
officials were using racial categories; in other words,
there was no proof problem. When public officials
segregated schools, they were explicit about their
use of racial categories to segregate. And when public officials inquire into the links between having
sickle cell anemia and being of African-American
heritage, they too are explicit in using racial categories. But matters are not always so simple. When
sentencing for criminal action distinguishes between
crack cocaine and regular cocaine,6 do we then have
a racial discrimination? According to the case law,
the prevailing answer to this question is, "No," and I
wish to question why this is so.
It is customary to cite Washington v. Davis7 as
the leading modem case. This case upheld the constitutionality of a civil service examination administered to all candidates who wished to be police officers, even though African-Americans were flunk'Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
2
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3

In re Slaughterhouse Case, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872); Brown v. BoardofEducation,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896);
Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S. at 495. Plessy and

Brown differed on the issue of state enforced segregation
in public schools.
5349 U.S. at 294.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207.
7426 U.S. 229 (1976).

ing the test more often than were Caucasians. The
Supreme Court asserted that disparate impact alone
was not enough to trigger "strict scrutiny."8 Instead,
a plaintiff must prove that the official actors had an
invidious intent to discriminate; the opinion acknowledged that the proof would normally proceed
by way of circumstantial evidence, but otherwise,
little was said about the details of the proof process.
Subsequent cases have spelled out the procedures that govern this process of proof 9 The plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence that establishes an initial, prima facie case of intent to discriminate. The defendant then has the burden of
coming forward and producing evidence that refutes
the inference. The burden of persuasion remains on
the plaintiff throughout the trial. These procedures
are perhaps overly baroque, but they are plausible.
These procedures can be justified by asserting that
the plaintiff ought to bear some initial burden, so
that judges can screen out frivolous cases; but once
the case is shown to be serious, and not frivolous,
then the defendant ought to have the, obligation to
produce evidence, since the defendant has possession of most of the crucial documents:
However, a reasonable procedure for proving
something is rather hollow unless we know what
we are trying to prove. What exactly is this "intent"
that the plaintiff must prove? And is the definition
of the requisite "intent" plausible?
The intent that a plaintiff must establish is defined in Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in
McCleskey v. Kemp.'0 In that case, Warren McCleskey
wished to challenge the death penalty as it was administered in Georgia; he claimed that the system
was administered in a racially discriminatory manner. McCleskey's proof was statistical; the numbers
8

11d. at 238. Had strict scrutiny been triggered, the

District of Columbia would have had to introduce evidence showing that the test did indeed predict the qual-

ity of the candidates' performance as a police officer; the
requisite studies had not been done, so no such evidence
would have been available. A failure of evidence, given
the relevance of strict scrutiny, would have entailed that
the test was unconstitutional.
9

See Keyes v. School District,396 U.S. 1215 (1969);
Keyes v. School District,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
10481 U.S. 279 (1987).

showed that the combination of black criminal and
white victim was the most lethal combination."
Thus, if a black killed a black, he was far less likely
to receive the death penalty than if he had killed a
white. 12 As you probably already know, the claim
was rejected: it was held that the numbers did not
establish the requisite bad (unconstitutional) intent.
Consider the following passage, which summarizes
Justice Lewis Powell's assessment of the evidence:
McCleskey also suggests that the [statistics prove]
that the State as a whole has acted with a discriminatory purpose. He appears to argue that the State
has violated the Equal Protection Clause by adopting the capital punishment statute and allowing it
to remain in force despite its allegedly discriminatory application. But" '[d]iscriminatory purpose'...
implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' it adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." For this claim to
prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the
Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death
penalty because
of an anticipated racially discrimi3
natory effect.'

The excerpt just quoted establishes a high
hurdle; it defines the intent that the plaintiff must
prove as being "because of" and not "in spite of."
This contrast is not crystal clear, although the line it
draws is probably no more fuzzy than most lines
that we lawyers draw. On one side of the line (the
good side, the constitutional side) is "in spite of,"
and legislators on that side of the line presumably
know that their legislation will fall more heavily upon
African-Americans, but regret that fact. On the other
side of the line (the bad side, the unconstitutional
side) is "because of," and legislators on that side of
the line both know and desire that their legislation
will disadvantage African-Americans. For example,
the type of school segregation that was litigated in
Brown was something that legislators consciously
sought; it was not a by-product of pursuing some
other end.
Should we draw the line as Powell has drawn
it? Perhaps it would be good to compare "intent."
Powell has defined it with "intent" as we use that
word in the criminal law, wherein "intentional hoI2IId. at 286.
11d.
'RId. at 29 (quoting PersonnelAdministratorsof Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (footnotes and cita-

tions omitted)(emphasis in original).

micide" is punished more severely than lesser grades
of homicide. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. gave
a classic summary of the law on this issue. Holmes
began by distinguishing between "intent" and "malice," as those words are understood in ordinary discourse:
When an act is said to be done with an intent
to do harm, it is meant that a wish for the harm
isthe motive of the act. Intent, however, isperfectly consistent with the harm being regretted
as such, and being wished only as a means to
something else. But when an act is said to be
done maliciously, it is meant, not only that a
wish for the harmful effect is the motive, but
also that the harm is wished for its own sake, or
as Austin would say with more accuracy, for the
sake of the pleasurable feeling which knowledge
of the suffering caused by the act would excite. 4
Is the distinction that Holmes draws between
the ordinary use of"intent" versus "malice" the same
as the distinction that Powell would draw between
"in spite of" versus "because of"? The distinctions
sound similar, although there may be some subtle
differences. At any rate, for the moment let me point
out that Holmes asserts that "malice," in its ordinary
meaning, is not part of the law of homicide, even
though the phrase "malice aforethought" is commonly used in describing that law; as a term of art,
"malice aforethought" does not mean the same thing
as does the ordinary English word "malice" in its colloquial sense. To prove the point, Holmes cites the
following hypothetical: "It is just as much murder
to shoot a sentry for the purpose of releasing a
friend, as to shoot him because you hate him.""
In short, the harm caused by the act, the consequences of the act, can be the means to an end and
yet the "intent"still be a criminal intention. Holmes
then points out that the intent which is directed
toward the consequences of the act can be further
analyzed. He states the issue as follows: "But intent
again will be found to resolve itself into two things;
foresight that certain consequences will follow from
an act, the wish for those consequences working as
a motive which induces the act.""' Are both foresight and wish required, or is foresight enough?
Holmes thought that foresight alone was enough.
,4 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 44

(1963).
'-ISd. at 45.
iId.

"For instance, a newly born child is laid naked out
of doors, where it must perish as a matter of course
This is none the less murder, that the guilty party
would have been veryt17 glad to have a stranger find
the child and save it."
Having come this far in his analysis, Holmes goes
on to break down the issue once more. What does it
mean to say that one foresees the consequences?
Holmes puts the matter as follows: But again, What
is foresight of consequences? It is a picture of a future state of things called up by knowledge of the
present state of things, the future being viewed as
standing to the present in the relation of effect to
cause. Again, we must seek a reduction to lower
terms. If the known present state of things is such
that the act done will very certainly cause death,
and the probability is a matter of common knowledge, one who does the act, knowing the present
state of things, is guilty of murder, and the law will
not inquire whether
he did actually foresee the con18
sequences or not.
In other words, it is enough for Holmes that
one has "actual present knowledge of the present
facts which make an act dangerous."19 If one knows
the facts, ignorance about the regular course of cause
and effect is irrelevant. Once again, Holmes illustrates the point with a hypothetical:
For instance, if a workman on a house-top at
mid-day knows that the space below him is a
street in a great city, he knows facts from which
a man of common understanding would infer
that there were people passing below. He is
therefore bound to draw that inference, or, in
other words, is chargeable with knowledge of
that fact also, whether he draws the inference
or not. If then, he throws down a heavy beam
into the street, he does an act which a person
of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to
cause death, or grievous bodily harm, and he is
dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether he does
so in fact or not. If a death is caused by the act,
he is guilty of murder. But if the workman has
reasonable cause to believe that the space below is a private yard from which every one is
excluded, and which is used as a rubbish-heap,
his act is not blameworthy, and the homicide is
mere misadventure2 0
17Id .

This last hypothetical may be controversial, but
it shouldn't be. One should remember that we have
subdivided the law of homicide, creating a set of
subcategories that complicates, but does not refute
nor render invalid Holmes' analysis. In a state such
as Virginia, one might suppose that a jury could rationally reach three different judgments about the
workman who throws the beam off the roof: 1) they
could judge that the workman had acted recklessly
and convict him of second degree murder; 2) they
could determine that there was gross negligence and
convict him of involuntary manslaughter; 3) or they
could find that there was only ordinary negligence
and conclude that there was no crime, leaving the
matter to the civil courts.2 ' I would like to point out
that Holmes did not invent his hypothetical; he cites
Blackstone; and one should note that the Virginia
Supreme Court also cites the very same passage from
Blackstone and, like Holmes, follows it."
What should one conclude from these excerpts from Holmes? At the very least, they establish that defining the concept of "intent" is no
easy task and that there is more than one way to
do it. If there is more than one way to define "intent," then Justice Powell was neither right nor
wrong in defining it as he did. If it is not a question of right or wrong, then it is a question of
better or worse. What is the best way to define
the "intent" that is necessary to find that the legislature has set up a de jure classification on the
basis of race? Powell's way of proceeding seems
puzzling, on first reading, since his definition
entails that we are being far more harsh to crimi-.
nal defendants than we are to state legislatures;
evidence that can send someone to jail for having
intended a homicide is not good enough to determine that a legislature has intended to make a
racial classification. Why should we do that?
Perhaps the answer to the puzzle is to be found
in the fact that a legislature is a collective body,
whereas a criminal is a single individual. When we
say that a legislature "intends" something, we are
treading on dangerous grounds. When a group of
legislators vote for a bill, different members will differ among themselves as to their motives; they will
differ in their knowledge and beliefs about the circumstances; and they will differ in their knowledge
of the words of the bill, with most voting without
21 Whireford v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 810

181ld.

(1828); For a further discussion see also Essex v. Com-

19 Id.

monwealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 218 (1984) (Poff, J.

20

concurring and dissenting).
"Id. at 813-814.

1d.

having read the bill. Perhaps the point of Powell's
test is creating a strict burden of proof. Perhaps
Powell thought that proof should be made difficult
because one is trying to prove something that may
be non-existent.
To understand the puzzle, however, is not to
approve of the solution. It seems that Powell's test
makes proof hard because it may be wrong to say
that a legislature "intends" to discriminate. However,
this entails that we regard the danger of an improper
labeling as that which must be avoided. Further, it
asks us to look away from the suffering of the plaintiff. One could say that Powell's primary sympathy

1 See Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review, in The Politics of Law (David Kairys ed.,
1982).

is with the perpetrator rather than the victim.23 Or
to put it more neutrally, one could say that Justice
Powell is pro-defendant rather than pro-plaintiff Of
course, it is not a logical mistake to prefer defendants to plaintiffs; but then, those who disapprove
are not being illogical either. It is also logical to say
that civil rights law is supposed to protect the plaintiffs of the world, and consequently, defining "intent" so strictly as to make it impossible to prove is
simply bad policy.
However, on this question, as on many others
in the law, there are sharp divisions, which are not
merely legal divisions but political divisions. The
politics of civil rights law is a mine field, and my
own judgment is that the politics are currently running in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff I suppose that judges have a hard time deciding
whether they should swim against the tide or with
it.

